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On the Information Leakage in Private Information
Retrieval Systems
Tao Guo, Ruida Zhou, and Chao Tian
Abstract—We consider information leakage to the user in
private information retrieval (PIR) systems. Information leakage
can be measured in terms of individual message leakage or
total leakage. Individual message leakage, or simply individual
leakage, is defined as the amount of information that the user can
obtain on any individual message that is not being requested, and
the total leakage is defined as the amount of information that the
user can obtain about all the other messages except the one being
requested. In this work, we characterize the tradeoff between the
minimum download cost and the individual leakage, and that for
the total leakage, respectively. New codes are proposed to achieve
these optimal tradeoffs, which are also shown to be optimal in
terms of the message size. We further characterize the optimal
tradeoff between the minimum amount of common randomness
and the total leakage. Moreover, we show that under individual
leakage, common randomness is in fact unnecessary when there
are more than two messages.
Index Terms—Privacy, information leakage, encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) [1],
[2] addresses the retrieval of one out of K messages from
N replicated databases, without revealing the identity of the
desired message to any individual database. A trivial solution
is to simply retrieve all the messages, however, the download
cost in this solution is unrealistic. Therefore, in the PIR
problem, the goal is to find an efficient protocol, i.e., with
the minimum download cost, to privately retrieve the desired
message. The capacity of a PIR system is defined as the
maximum number of bits of desired message that can be
retrieved per bit of downloaded information, which was shown
in [3] to be CPIR =
(
1 + 1/N + 1/N2 + · · ·+ 1/NK−1
)−1
.
There were also significant interests recently on various other
variations of the PIR problem; see, e.g., [4]–[28].
The problem considered in this work is closely related to the
symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) problem [5],
where “symmetric” refers to the fact that both user privacy
and database privacy need to be preserved. Database privacy
requires that the user obtains no information on other messages
beyond the requested message; strictly speaking, this is a
security requirement rather than a privacy requirement, and
we shall refer to it as such in the sequel. It was shown in
[5] that to ensure perfect security, the databases need to share
common randomness (a common key) which is independent
of the messages and only available to the databases. The
common key is used for randomizing the answers such that
no information about the non-desired messages is leaked. The
capacity of SPIR was shown to be CSPIR = 1 − 1/N =(
1 + 1/N + 1/N2 + · · ·+ 1/N∞
)−1
, as long as the amount
of common randomness is at least 1
N−1 bits per desired
message bit.
If the user can instead obtain some information about
the non-desired messages, then the system is said to have
information leakage [29]–[31]. This is the type of systems
that we wish to understand in this work. Allowing a small
amount of information leakage let us control the system
security level in a finer grain manner. In this context, SPIR
essentially requires strictly zero information leakage, while the
classical PIR does not have a security constraint at all. Thus
our goal is to understand the tradeoff between the download
cost and the amount of information leakage in the regime
other than these two extreme cases. Two different notations
of information leakage can be defined: the individual leakage
is defined as the amount of information that the user can
obtain about any individual non-desired message, and the total
leakage as the amount of information that the user can obtain
about all the non-desired messages. The former is similar to
the weak-security constraint cases seen in the literature [32]–
[35], while the latter thus corresponds to the standard strong-
security constraint cases.
The main result of this work is the characterizations of the
optimal tradeoffs between the download cost and the amount
of information leakage for both individual leakage and total
leakage. By adapting the codes given in [4] and [5], we provide
code constructions that can achieve these optimal tradeoffs;
moreover, they are also shown to have the minimum message
sizes. For the individual leakage case, the constructed codes
do not require common randomness (unless there are only
two messages). At the extreme case with perfect individual
message security, the download cost is in fact the same as
that with perfect total security. This is rather reassuring since it
implies that the stronger security requirement does not induce
any additional download cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We formally
define the problem and review the performance of classical
PIR and SPIR codes in Section II. Section III is devoted to
our main results on the optimal tradeoffs and the minimum
message size. The proofs are given in Section IV, Section V,
and the appendices. We conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Problem Statement
For positive integers K,N , let [1 : K] , {1, 2, · · · ,K}
and [1 : N ] , {1, 2, · · · , N}. For any k ∈ [1 : K], define the
complement set by k¯ , {1, 2, · · · ,K}\{k}.
In a private information retrieval (PIR) system, there are K
independent messages W1:K = (W1,W2, · · · ,WK), each of
2which is comprised of L i.i.d. symbols uniformly distributed
over a finite alphabet X . In log|X |-ary units, this implies that
H(W1:K) = H(W1) +H(W2) + · · ·+H(WK), (1)
H(W1) = H(W2) = · · · = H(WK) = L. (2)
There are a total of N databases, each of which stores
all the messages W1:K . A user aims to retrieve a message
Wk, k ∈ [1 : K] from the N databases without revealing the
identity k of the desired message to any individual database.
An independent random key F is used to generate queries
Q
[k]
1:N =
(
Q
[k]
1 , Q
[k]
2 , · · · , Q
[k]
N
)
, i.e.,
H(Q
[k]
1:N |F) = 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : K], (3)
where Q
[k]
n ∈ Qn for n ∈ [1 : N ]. For n ∈ [1 : N ], the
n-th query Q
[k]
n is sent to the n-th database. Since we wish
to protect the non-desired messages from unintentional access,
the databases may need to share a common random key S ∈ S
that is not accessible to the user, which induces the condition
H(W1:K ,F, S) = H(W1:K) +H(F) +H(S). (4)
Upon receiving Q
[k]
n , the n-th database generates an answer
A
[k]
n from the query Q
[k]
n , the stored messages W1:K , and the
common key S, i.e.,
A[k]n = ϕn(Q
[k]
n ,W1:K , S), ∀k ∈ [1 : K], ∀n ∈ [1 : N ], (5)
which implies
H(A[k]n |Q
[k]
n ,W1:K , S) = 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : K], ∀n ∈ [1 : N ]. (6)
The answer symbols are from a finite alphabet Y , i.e., A
[k]
n ∈
Yℓn , where ℓn is the length of the answer. Using all the
answers A
[k]
1:N =
(
A
[k]
1 , A
[k]
2 , · · · , A
[k]
N
)
from the N databases
and the values of F and k, the user perfectly decodes the
desired message Wk, which further implies that
H(Wk|A
[k]
1:N ,F) = 0. (7)
To satisfy the privacy requirement of keeping the desired
message index private to any one of the databases, the received
queries should be identically distributed, i.e.,
Q[k]n ∼ Q
[k′]
n , ∀k, k
′ ∈ [1 : K], ∀n ∈ [1 : N ]. (8)
Since W1:K , S, and F are independent, in light of (3), we
have
(Q[k]n ,W1:K , S) ∼ (Q
[k′]
n ,W1:K , S),
∀k, k′ ∈ [1 : K], ∀n ∈ [1 : N ]. (9)
Since A
[k]
n is a deterministic function of (Q
[k]
n ,W1:K , S), the
following identical distribution constraint must also hold
(Q[k]n , A
[k]
n ,W1:K , S) ∼ (Q
[k′]
n , A
[k′]
n ,W1:K , S),
∀k, k′ ∈ [1 : K], ∀n ∈ [1 : N ]. (10)
In contrast to the perfect security of the non-desired mes-
sages Wk¯ = (W1, · · · ,Wk−1,Wk+1, · · · ,WK) in [5], we
allow information leakage in this work. Define the total
leakage as I(Wk¯;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N ,F), which is the amount of
information that the user can obtain about all the non-desired
messages. Define the individual message leakage for message
k′ ∈ [1 : K] (k′ 6= k) as I(Wk′ ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N ,F), which is
the amount of information that the user can obtain about the
individual non-desired message-k′. The total leakage and the
individual leakage in the systems are constrained as follows
1
L
I(Wk¯;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N ,F) ≤ s, ∀k ∈ [1 : K] (11)
1
L
I(Wk′ ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N ,F) ≤ w, ∀k
′ 6= k ∈ [1 : K],(12)
where the parameters s and w are used to indicate the
strong security requirement and the weak security requirement,
respectively. For K = 2, since I(Wk¯;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N ,F) =
I(Wk′ ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N ,F), the total leakage constraint is equiva-
lent to the individual leakage constraint.
In a PIR system, the download cost is defined as
D , log|X | |Y|
N∑
n=1
E(ℓn), (13)
where the expectation is taken over the set Qn of all possible
queries. Note that D is a deterministic function of queries
and query distribution, but neither the particular realization
of messages nor the choice of desired message index k. The
amount of common randomness is normalized by the message
length L as
ρ ,
H(S)
L
. (14)
B. Analysis of Several Existing PIR Codes
Before presenting our main result, we provide the result of
a simple analysis on the capacity-achieving PIR code given
by Sun and Jafar [3], the capacity-achieving code proposed
by Tian et al. [4], and the SPIR code [5]; these three classes
of codes will be referred to as the SJ code, the TSC code, and
the SPIR code, respectively.
• The SJ code [3]:
L = NK ; (15)
D =
N(NK − 1)
N − 1
; (16)
1
L
I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:N ,F) =
1
N − 1
(
1−
1
NK−1
)
; (17)
1
L
I(Wk′ ;A
[k]
1:N ,F) =
1
NK−1
, ∀k′ 6= k ∈ [1 : K]. (18)
• The TSC code [4]:
L = N − 1; (19)
D =
NK − 1
NK−1
; (20)
1
L
I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:N ,F) =
1
N − 1
(
1−
1
NK−1
)
; (21)
1
L
I(Wk′ ;A
[k]
1:N ,F) =
1
NK−1
, ∀k′ 6= k ∈ [1 : K]. (22)
• The SPIR code [5]:
L = N − 1; (23)
D = N ; (24)
ρ = 1. (25)
3From (17), (21) and (18), (22), it is seen that the SJ code and
TSC code have the same performance in terms of both the total
leakage and the individual leakage. As an example, consider
the case N = 3, K = 3, then 1
L
I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:N , Q
[k]
1:N ,F) =
4
9
and 1
L
I(Wk′ ;A
[k]
1:N , Q
[k]
1:N ,F) =
1
9 for both the SJ code and
the TSC code.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Total Leakage
The following theorem characterizes the optimal tradeoff
between the minimum download cost Dmin and total leakage
constraint s. For notational convenience, define
D0min , L ·
(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)
. (26)
Theorem 1. If the amount of common randomness satisfies
ρ ≥ ρsmin, where
ρsmin ,
1
N − 1
−
NK−1
NK−1 − 1
· s, (27)
then the minimum download cost Dmin of the PIR system is
given by
Dmin =
{
L ·
(
N
N−1 −
1
NK−1−1 · s
)
, if 0 ≤ s ≤ st
D0min, otherwise,
(28)
where the threshold is defined by st ,
1
N−1
(
1− 1
NK−1
)
and
D0min is defined in (26). If ρ < ρ
s
min, then Dmin =∞.
Proof. The proof is given in Section IV.
Remark 1. The case where Dmin = ∞ indicates that it is
impossible to simultaneously meet all the system requirements,
i.e., i) retrieval; ii) privacy; iii) total leakage constraint. In this
case, the capacity C = 0.
In light of (27) and (28), we can view Dmin as a bivariate
function of ρ and s. For a given s, the dependency of Dmin
on ρ only appears at the threshold ρsmin so that i) Dmin =∞
if ρ < ρsmin; ii) Dmin < ∞ and Dmin is independent of ρ if
ρ ≥ ρsmin. For ρ ≥ ρ
s
min, the dependency of Dmin on (ρ, s) is
illustrated in Fig. 1. The dashed lines project the corner points
Dmin
s
ρ
0
L · N
N−1
D0min
st
ρsmin
Fig. 1: The dependency of Dmin on (ρ, s).
to the axises that show their values. The value of Dmin with
respective to (ρ, s) is given by the shaded area. We see that for
a given value of s, Dmin is a constant and thus independent
with ρ. The shaded area is projected onto the Dmin-s plane,
which is drawn in Fig. 2.
Dmin
s
0
L · N
N−1
st
D0min
Fig. 2: Tradeoff curve between Dmin and s.
The red line in Fig. 2 is the tradeoff curve between Dmin
and s for ρ ≥ ρsmin. Codes that achieve points on this optimal
tradeoff curve will be referred to as Pareto optimal codes. We
see from Fig. 2 that for s = 0, the problem reduces to SPIR
[5] for which the capacity is CSPIR =
L
Dmin
∣∣∣
s=0
= 1 − 1
N
.
We further observe that i) the threshold st is equal to the
normalized total leakage of the capacity-achieving SJ code
and TSC code in (17) and (21); ii) for s ≥ st, the capacity
C = L
Dmin
∣∣∣
s=st
= 1 + 1
N
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1
is equal to CPIR.
B. Individual Leakage
The following theorem characterizes the tradeoff between
the minimum download cost Dmin and the individual leakage
constraint w.
Theorem 2. If the amount of common randomness satisfies
ρ ≥ ρwmin, where
ρwmin ,
{
1
N−1 −
N
N−1 · w, if K = 2
0, if K ≥ 3,
(29)
then the minimum download cost Dmin of the PIR system is
given by
Dmin =
{
L ·
(
N
N−1 −
1
N−1w
)
, if 0 ≤ w ≤ 1
NK−1
D0min, otherwise,
(30)
where D0min is defined in (26). If ρ < ρ
w
min, then Dmin =∞.
Proof. The proof is given in Section V.
Remark 2. If ρ < ρwmin, it is impossible to meet all the
requirements of the PIR system simultaneously. In this case,
the capacity C = 0.
Remark 3. For K = 2, the individual leakage is equal to the
total leakage. The minimum download cost for the same value
of individual and total leakage levels are the same, which can
be easily verified from (28) and (30). Similarly, the minimum
amount of common randomness are also equal to each other,
i.e., ρsmin = ρ
w
min, which can be verified from (27) and (29).
This can be seen from the coding scheme in Section V-A.
Remark 4. Define a parameter s′ , s
1+N+···+NK−2
and
substitute into (28), then the expression of minimum download
cost in (28) and (30) have the same form. This roughly
4compares the amount of total leakage and individual leakage
for the same download cost.
From (29), it is seen that ρwmin = 0 for K ≥ 3, which
is the case when one non-desired messages can be used as
the encryption key to protect another individual non-desired
message. For K = 2, there is only one non-desired message,
and this makes it impossible to have another non-desired
messages as the encryption key. In this case, ρwmin is a linear
function of w as shown in (29). For ρ ≥ ρwmin, the dependency
of Dmin on (ρ, w) is illustrated in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
Dmin
w
ρ
0
L · N
N−1
D0min
1
NK−1
ρwmin
Fig. 3: The dependency of Dmin on (ρ, w).
Dmin
w
0
L · N
N−1
1
NK−1
D0min
Fig. 4: Tradeoff curve between Dmin and w.
The red line in Fig. 4 is the tradeoff curve between Dmin
and w for ρ ≥ ρwmin. Similar to the observations of Fig. 2, we
see from Fig. 4 that for w = 0, the problem becomes weakly
secure PIR (WS-PIR) which differs from SPIR only in the
type of security. The capacity of WS-PIR can be obtained by
calculating L
Dmin
at w = 0 from (30), which is given in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. If the amount of common randomness satisfies
ρ ≥
{
1
N−1 , if K = 2
0, if K ≥ 3,
(31)
the capacity of WS-PIR is given by
CWS-PIR = 1−
1
N
. (32)
If (31) is not satisfied, the capacity CWS-PIR = 0.
From this corollary, it is seen that CWS-PIR = CSPIR. It
is satisfying to see that requiring strong security does not
increase download cost compared to requiring weak security.
It is straightforward to verify that the optimal SPIR code in
[5] is also optimal for WS-PIR. In Section V-A, we propose
another optimal code for WS-PIR with K ≥ 3, where the
databases do not need to share common randomness.
Remark 5. Consider a specialization of s and w between the
corner point in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4. For an integer α, we write
s and w in the form of
s =
1
Nα
·
NK−1 − 1
N − 1
(33)
and
w =
1
Nα
. (34)
Denote the capacity of the PIR system for total and indi-
vidual leakage constraints in (33) and (34) by CS and CW ,
respectively. Substituting (33) into Theorem 1 and (34) into
Theorem 2, we obtain that for ρ ≥ max{ρsmin, ρ
w
min},
CS = CW =
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
Nα
)−1
, (35)
which has a common form as CPIR =
(
1 + 1
N
+ 1
N2
+
· · · + 1
NK−1
)−1
and CSPIR = CWS-PIR =
(
1 + 1
N
+ 1
N2
+
· · ·+ 1
N∞
)−1
. This demonstrates how the capacity decreases
from CPIR to CSPIR or CWS-PIR while strengthening the se-
curity requirement (i.e., decrease of s or w). For s and w
defined in (33) and (34), when we increase α, the capacity
of the system decreases by adding a term of 1
Nα
in the
denominator of the capacity expression. By increasing α from
K − 1 to ∞, s (or w) decreases from the threshold st (or
wt) to zero which means perfect security, and the capac-
ity finally decreases from
(
1 + 1
N
+ 1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1
)−1
to(
1 + 1
N
+ 1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
N∞
)−1
= 1− 1
N
.
C. Minimum Message Size
The message size L (in log|X |-ary unit) is also an important
factor to consider in practice [4]. The minimum message size
is highly dependent on the download cost. It was shown in [4]
that the message size of capacity-achieving PIR code is greater
than or equal to N−1 if the code is uniformly decomposable.
Before stating our results on the message size, we first define
the notion of uniformly decomposable code, similar to that in
[4].
A PIR code is called decomposable, if Y is a finite Abelian
group, and for each n ∈ [1 : N ] and q ∈ Qn, the answer
A
[k]
n = ϕn(q,W1:K , S) can be written in the form
ϕn(q,W1:K , S) =
(
ϕ
(q)
n,1(W1:K , S), · · · , ϕ
(q)
n,ℓn
(W1:K , S)
)
(36)
where for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ℓn},
ϕ
(q)
n,i(W1:K , S) = ϕ
(q)
n,i,1(W1)⊕· · ·⊕ϕ
(q)
n,i,K(WK)⊕ϕ
(q)
n,i,K+1(S),
(37)
where ⊕ denotes addition in the finite group Y , and each
ϕ
(q)
n,i,k (k ∈ [1 : K]) is a mapping X
L → Y and ϕ
(q)
n,i,K+1 is a
mapping S → Y .
5Furthermore, a decomposable code is called uniform if
any component function ϕ
(q)
n,i,k in (37) either satisfies the
conditions∣∣∣{x ∈ XL : ϕ(q)n,i,k(x) = y}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣{x ∈ XL : ϕ(q)n,i,k(x) = y′}∣∣∣ ,
y, y′ ∈ Y, k ∈ [1 : K], (38)
and∣∣∣{x ∈ S : ϕ(q)n,i,K+1(x) = y}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣{x ∈ S : ϕ(q)n,i,K+1(x) = y′}∣∣∣ ,
y, y
′
∈ Y, (39)
or it maps everything to the same value, i.e.,
ϕ
(q)
n,i,k(x) = ϕ
(q)
n,i,k(x
′), x, x′ ∈
{
XL, if k ∈ [1 : K]
S, if k = K + 1.
(40)
The terminology “decomposable” refers to the property in
(37) that each coded symbol is a summation of the component
functions on each individual message. A uniformly decompos-
able code has an additional property that each mapping ϕ
(q)
n,i,k
either preserves the uniform probability distribution or induces
a deterministic value. The following lemma and theorem are
our main results on the minimum message size.
Lemma 1. The minimum message size of any Pareto optimal
uniformly decomposable PIR code with either individual leak-
age constraint w or total leakage constraint s should be a
multiple of log|X | |Y|.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Remark 6. The lemma shows that L is a multiple of log|X | |Y|.
However, the term log|X | |Y| can be non-integer.
We can see from the Pareto optimal code constructions in
Sections IV and V that for most cases, we can simultaneously
achieve a message size of N − 1 and the minimum amount
of common randomness characterized in Theorems 1 and 2.
The only exception is the individual leakage case with K ≥ 3
and |X | = N = 2, for which the message size is twice the
minimum. Except for this case, we characterize the minimum
message size in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Except for the case of K ≥ 3, |X | = N = 2,
the minimum message size of any Pareto optimal uniformly
decomposable PIR codes achieving the minimum amount of
common random randomness with either individual leakage
constraint w or total leakage constraint s is (N−1) log|X | |Y|;
in particular, it equals to N − 1 if we restrict Y = X .
Proof. Except for the case of K ≥ 3, |X | = N = 2, we
have designed Pareto optimal codes achieving simultaneously
the minimum amount of common random randomness and the
minimum message size. Thus, we only need to prove the lower
bound L ≥ (N − 1) log|X | |Y|. The details can be found in
Appendix B.
Remark 7. It is remarkable that the minimum message size of
the Pareto optimal uniformly decomposable PIR codes with
leakage constraints w or s is the same as that of optimal
uniformly decomposable classical PIR codes without security
constraints.
D. Relation to Shannon Cipher System
In Shannon’s imperfect secrecy system in [30, pp. 71-72],X
is the plain text, Y is the cipher text, and Z is the encryption
key. Since X can be recovered from Y and Z , we have
H(X |Y, Z) = 0. It was proved in [30] that this constraint
implies
H(Z) ≥ H(X)− I(X ;Y ). (41)
This can be intuitively explained as follows: the key size is
greater than or equal to amount of information that we need
to protect, which is the difference between total amount of
information H(X) and the amount of information leakage
I(X ;Y ). The tradeoff between the minimum key size H(Z)
and the amount of information leakage I(X ;Y ) is illustrated
in Fig. 5(a).
H(Z)
I(X ;Y )
0
H(X)
H(X)
(a) Tradeoff between H(Z) and
information leakage I(X;Y ).
H(S)
I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NF)
0
1
N−1L
stL
(b) Tradeoff between H(S) and
total leakage I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NF).
Fig. 5: Comparison of encryption key size between imperfect
secrecy system and PIR system
Our result on the lower bound of common randomness in
(27) of Theorem 1 presents the similar form as (41), which
can be written as
H(S) ≥
1
N − 1
L−
NK−1
NK−1 − 1
I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NF). (42)
This can be interpreted as follows, where we focus on one
particular answer. The average size of any individual answer
should be at least 1
N−1L, and the term
NK−1
NK−1−1
I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NF)
in (42) can be viewed as the average amount of information
leakage per answer. The amount of common randomness must
be greater than or equal to the amount of information we need
to protect, which is the difference between the total amount of
information in an answer 1
N−1L and the information leakage
of that answer N
K−1
NK−1−1I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NF). The tradeoff between
H(S) and I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NF) is illustrated in Fig. 5(b). The
tradeoff curve is the same as that in Fig. 5(a), and thus our
result can also be interpreted as a generalization of Shannon’s
cipher system to multiple users with a privacy requirement.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We prove Theorem 1 by showing the achievability, converse,
and the minimum key size in the following.
A. Achievability
Following the analysis of Fig. 2, we only need to prove
the theorem for s ∈ [0, st]. Consider a message length of
L = N−1. In addition to the query generation in (3), now the
random key F generates one more indicator bit F0 ∈ {0, 1},
6according to probability P (F0 = 0) =
NK−1(N−1)s
NK−1−1 ∈ [0, 1]
and P (F0 = 1) = 1 −
NK−1(N−1)s
NK−1−1 . For x, y ∈ [1 : N ], it is
useful to define the operation (x+ y)N by
(x+ y)N =
{
x+ y, if x+ y ≤ N
x+ y −N, if x+ y > N.
(43)
And similarly,
(x− y)N =
{
x− y, if x− y > 0
x− y +N, if x− y ≤ 0.
(44)
For random key F = (F0, F1, F2, · · · , FK−1) ∈ {0, 1} × [1 :
N ]K−1, let F ∗ ,
(∑K−1
i=1 Fi
)
N
. Then the query for the n-th
database is generated as
Q[k]n = (F0, F1, · · · , Fk−1, (n− F
∗)N , Fk, · · · , FK−1) ,
n ∈ [1 : N ], k ∈ [1 : K]. (45)
Since the query is a length-(K + 1) vector, we can denote it
by Q
[k]
n,0:K . Upon receiving the queries, the databases generate
the answers using the TSC code for F0 = 0, and SPIR code
for F0 = 1. Specifically, the answer is
A[k]n =


W
1,Q
[k]
n,1
⊕ · · · ⊕W
K,Q
[k]
n,K
, if Q
[k]
n,0 = 0
W
1,Q
[k]
n,1
⊕ · · · ⊕W
K,Q
[k]
n,K
⊕ S, if Q
[k]
n,0 = 1,
(46)
where S is the common randomness shared among all
databases. The retrieval and privacy requirements are easily
seen from the TSC and SPIR codes. Then we can check the
code performances as follows.
1) Information leakage: in view of the performance of TSC
code in (19) and (21), the overall normalized total leakage
is
1
L
I(Wk¯;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N )
=
NK−1(N − 1)s
NK−1 − 1
·
1
N − 1
(
1−
1
NK−1
)
+
[
1−
NK−1(N − 1)s
NK−1 − 1
]
· 0 (47)
= s, (48)
which is the total leakage constraint.
2) Download cost: by (20) and (24), we have
D =
NK−1(N − 1)s
NK−1 − 1
·
NK − 1
NK−1
+
[
1−
NK−1(N − 1)s
NK−1 − 1
]
·N (49)
= N −
N − 1
NK−1 − 1
s (50)
= L ·
(
N
N − 1
−
1
NK−1 − 1
s
)
, (51)
which is the minimum download cost in (28).
3) Amount of common randomness: since common random-
ness is only used in the SPIR code, we derive from (25)
that
ρ =
1− N
K−1(N−1)s
NK−1−1
L
(52)
=
1
N − 1
−
NK−1
NK−1 − 1
· s, (53)
which is equal to ρsmin in (27) of Theorem 1.
This proves the achievability of Theorem 1 for s ∈ [0, st].
Remark 8. The code is obtained by combining TSC code
and SPIR code with certain probabilities, which is done by
sending one more query bit as an indicator. The method works
only when the two codes have the same message length, and
the message length of the combined code remains the same,
which is N − 1 here. This combination method outperforms
time-sharing in the sense that, with real-valued combination
coefficients, time-sharing may require a large message size
while the proposed scheme maintains the message size of
N − 1.
B. Converse
We first present the lemma that will be used later.
Lemma 2. For all k ∈ [1 : K],
NH(A
[k]
1:N ,W1:k|F) ≥ H(A
[k+1]
1:N ,W1:k+1|F) + k(N − 1)L.
(54)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Applying Lemma 2 repeatedly for k = 1, 2, · · · ,K− 1, we
have
NK−1H(A
[1]
1:NW1|F)
≥ NK−2H(A
[2]
1:NW1:2|F) +N
K−2(N − 1)L (55)
≥ NK−3H(A
[3]
1:NW1:3|F)
+NK−2(N − 1)L+ 2NK−3(N − 1)L (56)
... (57)
≥ H(A
[K]
1:NW1:K |F) +
(
K−1∑
i=1
iNK−1−i
)
(N − 1)L (58)
= H(A
[K]
1:NW1:K |F) +
(
K−1∑
i=1
N i − (K − 1)
)
L. (59)
By symmetry, for any k, k′ ∈ [1 : K] and k 6= k′, we have
NK−1H(A
[k]
1:NWk|F) ≥ H(A
[k′ ]
1:NW1:K |F)
+
(
K−1∑
i=1
N i − (K − 1)
)
L. (60)
7To obtain a lower bound on download cost D =
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∑N
n=1 E(ℓn) (c.f. (13)), consider
D = log|X | |Y|
N∑
n=1
E(ℓn)
=
∑
q1:N∈Q1:N
Pr(Q
[k]
1:N = q1:N )
N∑
n=1
ℓn log|X | |Y| (61)
≥
∑
q1:N∈Q1:N
Pr(Q
[k]
1:N = q1:N )
N∑
n=1
H(A(qn)n ) (62)
≥
∑
q1:N∈Q1:N
Pr(Q
[k]
1:N = q1:N )H(A
(q1)
1 , · · · , A
(qN )
N ) (63)
=
∑
q1:N∈Q1:N
Pr(Q
[k]
1:N = q1:N)H(A
[k]
1:N |Q
[k]
1:N = q1:N ) (64)
= H(A
[k]
1:N |F). (65)
Then we derive the following,(
NK−1 − 1
)
D + I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NQ
[k]
1:NF)
≥
(
NK−1 − 1
)
H(A
[k]
1:N |F) + I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:N |F) (66)
=
(
NK−1 − 1
)
H(A
[k]
1:N |F)
+
[
H(Wk¯) +H(A
[k]
1:NWk|F)−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)
]
(67)
=
[
(NK−1 − 1)H(A
[k]
1:N |F) +H(A
[k]
1:NWk|F)
]
+ (K − 1)L−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F) (68)
= NK−1H(A
[k]
1:NWk|F) + (K − 1)L−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)
(69)
≥
[
H(A
[k′]
1:NW1:K |F) +
(
K−1∑
i=1
N i − (K − 1)
)
L
]
+ (K − 1)L−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F) (70)
=
(
K−1∑
i=1
N i
)
L+
[
H(A
[k′]
1:NW1:K |F)−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)
]
,
(71)
where (69) follows from
H(A
[k]
1:N |F) = H(A
[k]
1:NQ
[k]
1:NWk|F) = H(A
[k]
1:NWk|F), (72)
and (70) follows from (60) for any k′ ∈ [1 : K] and k′ 6= k.
Similarly, by switching k and k′ in (71), we obtain(
NK−1 − 1
)
D + I(Wk¯′ ;A
[k′]
1:NQ
[k′]
1:NF)
≥
(
K−1∑
i=1
N i
)
L+
[
H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)−H(A
[k′ ]
1:NW1:K |F)
]
.
(73)
Summing up (71) and (73), we have
2
(
NK−1 − 1
)
D + I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NF) + I(Wk¯′ ;A
[k′ ]
1:NF)
≥ 2
(
K−1∑
i=1
N i
)
L. (74)
Thus the lower bound on D is
D ≥
N
N − 1
L
−
1
NK−1 − 1
I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NF) + I(Wk¯′ ;A
[k′ ]
1:NF)
2
(75)
≥ L ·
(
N
N − 1
−
1
NK−1 − 1
· s
)
, (76)
which matches the value of Dmin for s ∈ [0, st] in (28) of
Theorem 1. For s > st, the converse follows from that of
classical PIR. This completes the converse proof.
C. Amount of common randomness
To obtain the lower bound on the amount of common
randomness, we first consider the following,
NK−1I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NQ
[k]
1:NF) + (N
K−1 − 1)H(S)
= NK−1
[
H(Wk¯) +H(A
[k]
1:NWk|F)−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)
]
+ (NK−1 − 1)H(S) (77)
= NK−1H(Wk¯) +
[
NK−1H(A
[k]
1:NWk|F)−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)
]
+ (NK−1 − 1)
[
H(S)−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)
]
(78)
≥ NK−1(K − 1)L− (NK−1 − 1)H(W1:K)
+
[
NK−1H(A
[k]
1:NWk|F)−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)
]
(79)
≥ (K −NK−1)L +
(
K−1∑
i=1
N i − (K − 1)
)
L
+
[
H(A
[k′]
1:NW1:K |F)−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)
]
(80)
=
(
K−2∑
i=0
N i
)
L+
[
H(A
[k′]
1:NW1:K |F)−H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)
]
,
(81)
where (79) follows from
H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)−H(W1:K)
= H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:KF) (82)
= H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:KQ
[k]
1:NF)−H(A
[k]
1:N |W1:KQ
[k]
1:NFS) (83)
= I(S;A
[k]
1:N |W1:KQ
[k]
1:NF). (84)
and
H(S)− I(S;A
[k]
1:N |W1:KQ
[k]
1:NF) ≥ 0, (85)
and (80) follows from (60) for any k′ ∈ [1 : K] and k′ 6= k.
Similarly, by switching k and k′ in (81), we obtain
NK−1I(Wk¯′ ;A
[k′]
1:NQ
[k′]
1:NF) + (N
K−1 − 1)H(S)
≥
(
K−2∑
i=0
N i
)
L+
[
H(A
[k]
1:NW1:K |F)−H(A
[k′]
1:NW1:K |F)
]
.
(86)
Summing up (81) and (86), we have
2(NK−1 − 1)H(S) +NK−1
[
I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NF) + I(Wk¯′ ;A
[k′]
1:NF)
]
≥ 2
(
K−2∑
i=0
N
i
)
L. (87)
8Then we have
ρ =
H(S)
L
(88)
≥
∑K−2
i=0 N
i
NK−1 − 1
L
−
NK−1
NK−1 − 1
I(Wk¯;A
[k]
1:NF) + I(Wk¯′ ;A
[k′]
1:NF)
2
(89)
≥
1
N − 1
−
NK−1
NK−1 − 1
· s, (90)
which is exactly the lower bound in (27) of Theorem 1.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
A. Optimal code for WS-PIR
Even though the SPIR code in [5] achieves the capacity of
WS-PIR, it does not always achieve the minimum amount of
common randomness for WS-PIR. From (31) in Corollary 1,
we see that for K = 2, the minimum amount of common
randomness of WS-PIR is equal to that of SPIR. This is
because for K = 2, weak security is equivalent to strong
security which means that WS-PIR is equivalent to SPIR.
Thus, the SPIR code in [5] also achieves the minimum amount
of common randomness of WS-PIR.
For K ≥ 3, (31) indicates that the databases do not need to
share common randomness. We consider the following three
cases:
i) |X | ≥ 3 and N ≥ 2;
ii) |X | = 2 and N ≥ 3;
iii) |X | = N = 2.
Next, we propose an optimal code for WS-PIR that uses the
sum of all message symbols as encryption key shared by
databases and no extra randomness is needed. The code design
is simply to modify TSC code by adding the shared encryption
key (sum of all message symbols) to each of the answers.
Case i): The code has a message length of L = N − 1.
Specifically, by appending dummy variables Wk,N = 0, the
message Wk can be written as
Wk = (Wk,1,Wk,2 · · · ,Wk,N−1,Wk,N ). (91)
Let the random key F of the user be chosen from [1 : N ]K−1
which gives
F = (F1, F2, · · · , FK−1). (92)
For x, y ∈ [1 : N ], the operation (x + y)N and (x − y)N
are defined by (43) and (44). Let F ∗ ,
(∑K−1
i=1 Fi
)
N
. For
k ∈ [1 : K] and n ∈ [1 : N ], the query is a deterministic
function of the random key F, defined as
Q[k]n =
(
F1, F2, · · · , Fk−1, (n−F
∗)N , Fk, · · · , FK−1
)
. (93)
The sum of all message symbols is denoted by S, which is
S =
K∑
k=1
(
Wk,1 ⊕Wk,2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Wk,N−1
)
. (94)
Upon receiving the query Q
[k]
n , the n-th database generates an
answer A
[k]
n using Q
[k]
n as linear combination indexes of all
the message symbols. We further add the encryption key S to
each answer and obtain that
A[k]n = W1,F1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Wk−1,Fk−1 ⊕Wk,(n−F∗)N
⊕Wk+1,Fk ⊕ · · · ⊕WK,FK−1 ⊕ S. (95)
For simplicity, we define
B=W1,F1⊕· · ·⊕Wk−1,Fk−1⊕Wk+1,Fk⊕· · ·⊕WK,FK−1 , (96)
where ⊕ denotes the addition operation in finite group X (this
is an abuse of notation without ambiguity). Substituting (96)
into (95), we have
A[k]n = Wk,(n−F∗)N ⊕B ⊕ S. (97)
The user receives all the answers from databases, i.e.,
A
[k]
1 , A
[k]
2 , · · · , A
[k]
N . Then we see that
Wk,(n−F∗)N = A
[k]
n ⊖A
[k]
F∗ = A
[k]
n ⊖ (B ⊕ S), (98)
where ⊖ is the subtraction operation in the Abelian group X .
Then the message Wk can be recovered by ranging n from 1
to N .
Since F is chosen uniformly from {0, 1}K−1 and all the
queries are deterministic functions of F, we see that Q
[k]
n is
chosen uniformly from the query set for any k ∈ [1 : K] and
n ∈ [1 : N ]. Thus Q
[k]
n provides no information about the
message index k, which ensures the privacy.
The weak security (individual leakage) can be seen as
follows. The coefficient of each message symbol Wk,i (k ∈
[1 : K], i ∈ [1 : N − 1]) in the expression of B ⊕ S can only
be 1 or 2. Because of the assumption that |X | ≥ 3, none of
the message symbols will vanish. Since K ≥ 3, there is at
least one k′′ ∈ [1 : K] such that k′′ 6= k, k′. Then the message
symbols of Wk′′ randomizes the sum of symbols from Wk
and Wk′ , and thus we obtain that
I(B ⊕ S;Wk′Wk) = 0, (99)
which implies
I(B ⊕ S;Wk) = I(B ⊕ S;Wk′ |Wk) = 0. (100)
Thus, we have
I(Wk′ ;B ⊕ S,Wk) = I(Wk′ ;Wk) + I(Wk′ ;B ⊕ S|Wk) = 0.
(101)
To see the security, we consider the following,
I(Wk′ ;A
[k]
1:NQ
[k]
1:NF) = I(Wk′ ;A
[k]
1:NQ
[k]
1:NWkF) (102)
= I(Wk′ ;A
[k]
1:NWkF) (103)
= I(Wk′ ;B ⊕ S,WkF) (104)
= I(Wk′ ;B ⊕ S|WkF) (105)
= 0, (106)
where (102) follows from the recovery in (98), (104) follows
from the expression of answer in (97), (105) follows from the
independence of Wk′ and (Wk,F), and the last step follows
from (101) and the independence of F and (Wk,Wk′ ).
Since each answer consists of one symbol, the download
cost is
D = N. (107)
9Since L = N − 1, the rate of the code is simply R = N−1
N
=
1− 1
N
that matches the capacity in (32) of Corollary 1. Lastly,
the databases do not share common randomness in addition to
the messages themselves.
Case ii): It is easy to verify that the code also works for
|X | = 2 and N ≥ 3. This can be seen intuitively as follows.
Since L = N − 1 ≥ 2, each message consists of at least two
symbols. The encryption key S consists of all the message
symbols. Since Wk,(n−F∗)N ⊕B contains at most one symbol
from each message, it can cancel out at most one symbol from
S. Then the answer A
[k]
n = Wk,(n−F∗)N ⊕ B ⊕ S (c.f. (97))
contains at least one symbol from each message. SinceK ≥ 3,
(99) and the subsequent equations also hold for the current
case. This ensures the security of each individual message.
Case iii): For the case that N = 2 and |X | = 2, let L =
2(N − 1) = 2. We can divide each message into two sub-
messages, i.e., Wk = (W
(1)
k ,W
(2)
k ) for k ∈ [1 : K]. Then
we apply the code in Case i) to each sub-message, where we
choose the same encryption key as S =
∑K
k=1W
(1)
k ⊕W
(2)
k .
The parameters F(1),F(2) ∈ {1, 2}K−1 are chosen to be dual
of each other, i.e., F(1) and F(2) differ in every position. The
private retrieval requirement is easy. We can see the weak
security from the following example of K = 3. Let k = 2
and the random key to be chosen as F(1) = (2, 1) and F(2) =
(1, 2), then the queries are
q
(1)
1 = (2, 1, 1), q
(1)
2 = (2, 2, 1) (108)
and
q
(2)
1 = (1, 1, 2), q
(2)
2 = (1, 2, 2). (109)
The parameters B(1) ⊕ S and B(2) ⊕ S of the two sub-codes
are thus
B(1)⊕S=W
(1)
1,2 ⊕W
(1)
3,1 ⊕ S=W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
3 , (110)
B(2)⊕S=W
(2)
1,1 ⊕W
(2)
3,2 ⊕ S=W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
3 ⊕W
(2)
3 . (111)
We can easily see that (B(1)⊕S,B(2)⊕S) provides no infor-
mation about either W1 or W3. Then using similar arguments
as (99)-(106), we can obtain the weak security.
Remark 9. The SPIR code in [5] is an optimal code for WS-
PIR that achieves capacity. However, it is important to point
out that the method of using the sum of message symbols as
encryption keys does not work for SPIR, since it leaks partial
of the total information of the whole message set W1:K .
B. Achievability of Pareto Optimal Points
Following the analysis of Fig. 4 after Corollary 1, we only
need to prove the theorem for w ∈ [0, wt]. Since for K = 2,
the WS-PIR code reduces to SPIR code and the achievability
is proved in Section IV-A, we consider only K ≥ 3 here.
Similar to Section IV-A, consider a message length of
L = N−1. The random key F generates one more indicator bit
F0 ∈ {0, 1} according to probability P (F0 = 0) = wN
K−1 ∈
[0, 1] and P (F0 = 1) = 1−wN
K−1. The queries and answers
are generated similarly as that in Section IV-A. The only
difference is to replace S by the encryption key using (94).
We then check the following.
1) Information leakage: in view of the performance of TSC
code in (19) and (22), the overall normalized total leakage
is
1
L
I(Wk¯;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N ,F)
= wNK−1 ·
1
NK−1
+ (1− wNK−1) · 0 (112)
= w, (113)
which is the individual leakage constraint.
2) Download cost: by (20) and (107), we have
D = wNK−1 ·
NK − 1
NK−1
+ (1 − wNK−1) ·N (114)
= N − w (115)
= L ·
(
N
N − 1
−
1
N − 1
w
)
, (116)
which is the minimum download cost in (30) of Theo-
rem 2.
3) Amount of common randomness: i) for K = 2, the key
size in (53) reduces to 1
N−1 −
N
N−1 · w; ii) for K ≥ 3,
there is no common randomness needed and ρ = 0. Thus
the amount of common randomness of the code is equal
to ρsmin in (27) of Theorem 1.
This proves the achievability of Theorem 2 for w ∈ [0, wt].
Remark 10. We notice that the linear combination coefficients
as well as the other code performances here are the same as
that of the linear combination between TSC and SPIR codes
in Section IV-A. The reason is CWS-PIR = CPIR and the WS-
PIR code in Section V-A has the same message length and
download cost as SPIR code in [5].
C. Converse
For any k, k′ ∈ [1 : K] and k 6= k′, we first derive the
following which is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.
NH(A
[k]
1:NWk|F)
≥
N∑
n=1
H(A[k]n Wk|F) (117)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[k]n Wk|Q
[k]
n ) (118)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[k
′]
n Wk|Q
[k′]
n ) (119)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[k
′]
n Wk|F) (120)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[k
′]
n |WkF) +NH(Wk) (121)
≥
N∑
n=1
H(A[k
′]
n |WkFA
[k′]
1:n−1) +NL (122)
= H(A
[k′]
1:N |WkF) +NL (123)
= H(A
[k′]
1:NWk|F) + (N − 1)L (124)
10
= H(A
[k′]
1:NQ
[k′]
1:NWkWk′ |F) + (N − 1)L (125)
= H(A
[k′]
1:NWkWk′ |F) + (N − 1)L, (126)
where (118) and (120) follow from the Markov chain
(A
[k]
n ,W[1:K])→ Q
[k]
n → F, and (119) follows from identical
distribution constraint in (10). Thus, we have
NH(A
[k]
1:NWk|F)−H(A
[k′]
1:NWkWk′ |F) ≥ (N − 1)L. (127)
To provide a lower bound on the download cost D (c.f. (13)),
we derive the following
(N − 1)D + I(Wk′ ;A
[k]
1:NQ
[k]
1:NF)
≥ (N − 1)H(A
[k]
1:N |F) + I(Wk′ ;A
[k]
1:N |F) (128)
=
[
H(Wk′ ) +H(A
[k]
1:NWk|F)−H(A
[k]
1:NWkWk′ |F)
]
+ (N − 1)H(A
[k]
1:NWk|F) (129)
= NH(A
[k]
1:NWk|F)−H(A
[k]
1:NWkWk′ |F) + L (130)
≥ NL+
[
H(A
[k′]
1:NWkWk′ |F)−H(A
[k]
1:NWkWk′ |F)
]
(131)
where (128) follows from (65), (129) follows from (3) and
(7), and (131) follows from (127). By switching k and k′ in
(131), we obtain
(N − 1)D + I(Wk;A
[k′]
1:NQ
[k′]
1:NF)
≥ NL+
[
H(A
[k]
1:NWkWk′ |F)−H(A
[k′]
1:NWkWk′ |F)
]
. (132)
Summing up (131) and (132), we have
2(N − 1)D +
[
I(Wk′ ;A
[k]
1:NF) + I(Wk;A
[k′]
1:NF)
]
≥ 2NL.
Thus, the lower bound on D is
D ≥
N
N − 1
L−
1
N − 1
I(Wk′ ;A
[k]
1:NF) + I(Wk;A
[k′]
1:NF)
2
≥ L ·
(
N
N − 1
−
1
N − 1
w
)
(133)
which matches the value of Dmin for w ∈ [0, wt] in (30) of
Theorem 2. For w > wt, the converse follows from that of
classical PIR. This completes the converse proof.
D. Minimum Key Size
For K = 2, individual leakage is equal to total leakage,
which means that PIR system with the same value of total
leakage constraint s and individual leakage constraint w are
equivalent. This gives the minimum amount of common ran-
domness in (29) of Theorem 2. For K ≥ 3, the lower bound
in (29) is zero, which is trivial.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the PIR problem with total and
individual leakage constraints, respectively. Our main contri-
bution was the characterization of the tradeoffs between the
minimum download cost Dmin and the total leakage constraint
s and individual leakage constraint w. The minimum amount
of common randomness with respect to s and w was also
characterized. Remarkably, for K ≥ 3, the databases do not
need to share common randomness in order to achieve the
individual leakage constraint w. For s ∈ [0, st], it was shown
that the linear combination of TSC code and SPIR code
is Pareto optimal (achieving the whole tradeoff curve). For
w ∈ [0, wt], an optimal code that achieves the capacity of
WS-PIR without shared common randomness was proposed
(K ≥ 3), and its linear combination with the classical PIR
code was proved Pareto optimal. The proposed Pareto optimal
codes for both individual and total leakage were proved to
have a minimum message size of N − 1.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Throughout the proof, we use L to denote the mini-
mum message size for Pareto optimal uniformly decompos-
able codes. Since we have coding scheme of message size
(N − 1) log|X | |Y|, the minimum message size should be
L ≤ (N − 1) log|X | |Y|. If L = (N − 1) log|X | |Y|, we are
done. Otherwise, L < (N − 1) log|X | |Y|.
In the following, we prove the lemma by contradiction and
suppose that Llog|X| |Y|
is not an integer. We only consider the
individual leakage case, since by Remark 4 the same results
also hold for the total leakage case. From (30) in Theorem 2,
the average number of downloaded symbols in Y for Pareto
optimal codes should be
DY =
L
log|X | |Y|
(
N
N − 1
−
w
N − 1
)
=
N − w
N − 1
L
log|X | |Y|
.
(134)
Since L < (N − 1) log|X | |Y| implies 0 <
N−w
N−1
L
log|X| |Y|
−
L
log|X| |Y|
< 1, the only possible realization of queries that
have a downloaded number of symbols d ≤ DY are those q
inducing d = ⌈ Llog|X| |Y|
⌉ downloaded symbols. It is easy to
see that
L < ⌈
L
log|X | |Y|
⌉ · log|X | |Y| < (L + 1). (135)
Since the equality in (128) is equivalent to equality in (65), we
see from Appendix B that independence property P1 holds for
both total and individual leakage cases. By P1 and uniform
distribution of answer symbols, we obtain
H(A
(q)
1:N ) = ⌈
L
log|X | |Y|
⌉ · log|X | |Y|. (136)
Since the whole answer set can recover Wk, we have
H(Wk|A
(q)
1:N ) = 0, and thus
H(A
(q)
1:N |Wk) = H(A
(q)
1:N )−H(Wk). (137)
Then from (135) and (136), we can bound H(A
(q)
1:N |Wk) by
0 < H(A
(q)
1:N |Wk) < log|X | |Y|. (138)
Next, we derive another bound for H(A
(q)
1:N |Wk), which leads
to a contradiction. By the definition of uniform code in (38)-
(40), denote the non-deterministic symbols of A
(q)
1:N by A
(q)
n,i =
ϕ
(q)
n,i. For n ∈ [1 : N ] and i ∈ [1 : ℓn], define a random variable
by U
(q)
n,i = A
(q)
n,i ⊖ ϕ
(q)
n,i,k(Wk). Then, we have
H(A
(q)
1:N |Wk) = H(U
(q)
1,1 , · · · , U
(q)
N,ℓN
). (139)
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We see that U
(q)
n,i is either deterministic or uniformly dis-
tributed over Y , thusH(U
(q)
n,i ) = 0 or log|X | |Y|. IfH(U
(q)
n,i ) =
0 for all (n, i), we have H(U
(q)
1,1 , · · · , U
(q)
N,ℓN
) = 0. Otherwise,
there is at least one pair (n, i) such that H(U
(q)
n,i ) = log|X | |Y|,
which implies that H(U
(q)
1,1 , · · · , U
(q)
N,ℓN
) ≥ log|X | |Y|. Thus,
we see from (139) that
H(A
(q)
1:N |Wk)
{
= 0
≥ log|X | |Y|.
(140)
Now, (140) contradicts with (138). Then the supposition that
L
log|X| |Y|
is non-integer is false, and thus L is a multiple of
log|X | |Y|.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
A. Total Leakage Case
In [4], three properties P1-P3 were used to prove the min-
imum message size. Here, we verify that P1-P3 are also true
for Pareto optimal uniformly decomposable PIR codes with
total leakage constraint s, and then the minimum message size
can be obtained accordingly. We first define some notations
before presenting the properties. For notational simplicity,
we write WK+1 = S and then W1:K+1 = (W1:K , S) and
Wk¯ = (W1, · · · ,Wk−1,Wk+1, · · · ,WK , S). For n ∈ [1 : N ]
and q ∈ Qn, the answer for decomposable codes can be simply
written in matrix form as
A[k]n = ϕn(Q
[k]
n = q,W1:K , S) = W1:K+1 ·G
(q)
n , (141)
whereW1:K+1 is viewed as a length-(K+1) vector, and G
(q)
n
is a matrix of dimension (K +1)× ln whose elements G
(q)
n,i,k
are functions XL(or S) → Y with the “·” operation defined
as
Wk ·G
(q)
n,i,k , ϕ
(q)
n,i,k(Wk). (142)
Let q1:N be a set of queries such that Pr(Q
[k]
1:N = q1:N ) > 0.
For any A ⊆ [1 : K], let G
(q)
n|A be the submatrix of
G
(q)
n with rows corresponding to {Wi, i ∈ A} removed. For
Pareto optimal uniformly decomposable PIR codes, the three
properties are stated as follows.
P1. The N random variables A
(q1)
1 , A
(q2)
2 , · · · , A
(qN )
N are mu-
tually independent, where A
(qn)
n is the n-th answer when
Q
[k]
n = qn.
P2. The N random variables Wk¯ ·G
(q1)
1|k ,Wk¯ ·G
(q2)
2|k , · · · ,Wk¯ ·
G
(qN )
N |k are deterministic of each other.
P3. The N random variables Wk ·G
(q1)
1|k¯
,Wk ·G
(q2)
2|k¯
, · · · ,Wk ·
G
(qN )
N |k¯
are mutually independent.
Then the properties can be verified as follows.
i) It is easily seen from the proof of P1 in [4] that the
equality of (65) in the current paper holds if and only if
the equality in Lemma 1 of [4] holds.
ii) When (175) is equality, we obtain for k = 1 that
H(A
[1]
1:N |W1A
[1]
n F) = 0, (143)
which is exactly the condition that proves P2 in [4].
iii) The inequality in (180) is exactly the same as (d) in the
proof of Lemma 2 in [4], which induces P3.
The above observations ensure that the properties P1-P3 are
also true for Pareto optimal uniformly decomposable PIR
codes with total leakage constraint s. Then we can use
the argument in [4] to lower bound the message size as
L ≥ (N − 1) log|X | |Y|.
B. Individual Leakage Case
For the individual leakage case, the following lemma pro-
vides a new method of proving the minimum message size.
We can also apply the same method to the total leakage case,
where the analysis of total leakage may be more complicated.
The details for verifying this is omitted here.
Lemma 3. The message size of Pareto optimal uniformly
decomposable PIR codes with individual leakage constraint
w is lower bounded by L ≥ (N − 1) log|X | |Y|.
Proof. For w > 1
NK−1
, the problem is equivalent to classical
PIR. Thus, we only consider w ∈ [0, 1
NK−1
], for which we
prove the lemma by contradiction. By Lemma 1, we suppose
there exist Pareto optimal uniformly decomposable codes such
that
L ≤ (N − 2) log|X | |Y|. (144)
Fix a k ∈ [1 : K]. For each query realization Q
[k]
1:N = q1:N , let
d be the corresponding total number of downloaded symbols
in Y , which can be written as
d =
N∑
n=1
ℓn(qn). (145)
Because of recovery requirement of Wk, we have
d ≥
L
log|X | |Y|
. (146)
For nonnegative integer m, let Q(m) be the set of query
realizations defined by
Q(m) ,
{
q1:N : d =
L
log|X | |Y|
+m
}
. (147)
Define a probability P (m) by
P (m) =
∑
q1:N∈Q(m)
Pr(q1:N ). (148)
From (134), the average number of downloaded symbols in Y
for Pareto optimal codes is
DY =
N − w
N − 1
L
log|X | |Y|
, (149)
which, by the supposition (144) and the range of w ∈
[0, 1
NK−1
], satisfies
0 < DY −
L
log|X | |Y|
< 1, (150)
and thus DY is not an integer. In light of the lower bound of
d in (146), the only possible realization of queries that induce
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d < DY are q1:N ∈ Q
(0), and the corresponding downloaded
number of symbols is d = Llog|X| |Y|
. Then we have
DY =
∑
m
P (m)
(
L
log|X | |Y|
+m
)
(151)
=
(∑
m
P (m)
)
L
log|X | |Y|
+
∑
m≥1
mP (m) (152)
=
L
log|X | |Y|
+
∑
m≥1
mP (m) (153)
≥
L
log|X | |Y|
+
∑
m≥1
P (m) (154)
=
L
log|X | |Y|
+ (1 − P (0)), (155)
which by (149) implies that
P (0) ≥ 1−
1− w
N − 1
L
log|X | |Y|
. (156)
In the following, we will derive a lower bound for informa-
tion leakage that leads to a contradiction with the individual
leakage constraints. For q1:N ∈ Q
(0), we have
d = ℓ1 + ℓ2 + · · ·+ ℓN =
L
log|X | |Y|
. (157)
which implies ℓn ∈
[
0 : Llog|X| |Y|
]
for any n ∈ [1 : N ]. Then
for any n ∈ [1 : N ], define a parameter by
T [k]n ,
L
log|X| |Y|∑
i=1
i · Pr
{
q1:N ∈ Q
(0), ℓn = i
}
, (158)
which can be roughly viewed as the average length of the
answer when q1:N ∈ Q
(0). Then it is intuitive that
N∑
n=1
T [k]n =
L
log|X | |Y|
· P (0), (159)
which implies that there exists an n ∈ [1 : N ] such that
T [k]n ≥
L
log|X| |Y|
N
· P (0). (160)
In the following, we consider this particular n. Then by (156),
we have
T [k]n ≥
L
log|X| |Y|
N
(
1−
1− w
N − 1
L
log|X | |Y|
)
. (161)
For q1:N ∈ Q
(0), since each answer symbol is either determin-
istic or uniformly distributed over Y , we obtain from (157)
that
H(A
(q1:N )
1:N ) ≤
L
log|X | |Y|
· log|X | |Y| = L = H(Wk). (162)
This together with the recovery requirement of Wk, i.e.,
H(Wk|A
(q1:N )
1:N ) = 0, imply that
H(A
(q1:N )
1:N ) = H(Wk). (163)
Then for the queries q1:N ∈ Q
(0), the answers A
(q1:N )
1:N
and the message Wk are deterministic of each other, and
all the answer symbols are non-deterministic. Let A
(qn)
n =(
A
(qn)
n,1 , A
(qn)
n,2 , · · · , A
(qn)
n,ℓn
)
where each componentA
(qn)
n,j ∈ Y .
Then we have
I(Wk;A
(qn)
n,j ) = H(A
(qn)
n,j ) = log|X | |Y|, ∀j ∈ [1 : ℓn]. (164)
Define a set of query realizations of Q
[k]
n by Q
(0)
n ,{
qn : q1:N ∈ Q
(0)
}
. Since for q1:N /∈ Q
(0), the n-th query
can also be in Q
(0)
n , we have
Pr{qn ∈ Q
(0)
n } ≥ Pr{q1:N ∈ Q
(0)}. (165)
Next, we use (161) to derive an lower bound for individual
leakage that will lead to a contradiction. Consider k′ 6= k.
Similarly, we define T
[k′]
n by
T [k
′]
n ,
L
log|X| |Y|∑
i=1
i · Pr
{
qn ∈ Q
(0)
n , ℓn = i
}
. (166)
Then the leakage of Wk from the answers for k
′ can be
bounded as follows,
I(Wk;A
[k′]
1:NQ
[k′]
1:N) ≥ I(Wk;A
[k′]
n Q
[k′]
n ) ≥ T
[k′]
n · log|X | |Y|,
(167)
where the last inequality follows from (164). Because of
identical distribution of Q
[k]
n and Q
[k′]
n in (10), we obtain from
(165) that
Pr
{
Q[k
′]
n ∈ Q
(0)
n
}
= Pr
{
Q[k]n ∈ Q
(0)
n
}
≥ Pr
{
Q
[k]
1:N ∈ Q
(0)
}
,
which implies that
T [k
′]
n ≥ T
[k]
n . (168)
By (167), (168), and the lower bound in (161), we obtain
I(Wk;A
[k′]
1:NQ
[k′]
1:N ) ≥
L
N
(
1−
1− w
N − 1
L
log|X | |Y|
)
. (169)
In the following, we derive the contradiction by arguing
L
N
(
1−
1− w
N − 1
L
log|X | |Y|
)
> wL, (170)
which can be verified equivalent to
w <
(N − 1)− Llog|X| |Y|
(N2 −N)− Llog|X| |Y|
. (171)
It is easy to see that the right-hand side is a decreasing function
of L. Since by assumption L ≤ (N − 2) Llog|X| |Y|
, we have
(N − 1)− Llog|X| |Y|
(N2 −N)− Llog|X| |Y|
≥
(N − 1)− (N − 2)
(N2 −N)− (N − 2)
=
1
N2 − 2(N − 1)
. (172)
For K ≥ 3 and N ≥ 2, we can see that 1
N2−2(N−1) >
1
NK−1
.
Thus, for any w ∈ [0, 1
NK−1
], we have
1
N2 − 2(N − 1)
> w. (173)
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From (172) and (173), we obtain (171), and thus the argument
(170) is true. Then (169) and (170) imply that
I(Wk;A
[k′]
1:NQ
[k′]
1:N ) > wL, (174)
which contradicts the individual leakage constraint definition
in (12). Thus, the supposition at beginning that L ≤ (N −
2) Llog|X| |Y|
is false, and this proves the lemma.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
To prove the lemma, we consider the following.
NH(A
[k]
1:N ,W1:k|F)
≥
N∑
n=1
H(A[k]n ,W1:k|F) (175)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[k]n ,W1:k|Q
[k]
n ) (176)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[k+1]n ,W1:k|Q
[k+1]
n ) (177)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[k+1]n ,W1:k|F) (178)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[k+1]n |W1:k,F) +NH(W1:k) (179)
≥
N∑
n=1
H(A[k+1]n |W1:k,FA
[k+1]
1:n−1) +NH(W1:k) (180)
= H(A
[k+1]
1:N |W1:k,F) +NH(W1:k) (181)
= H(A
[k+1]
1:N ,W1:k|F) + (N − 1)H(W1:k) (182)
= H(A
[k+1]
1:N , Q
[k+1]
1:N ,W1:k+1|F) + (N − 1)H(W1:k) (183)
= H(A
[k+1]
1:N ,W1:k+1|F) + k(N − 1)L, (184)
where (176) and (178) follow from the Markov chain
(A
[k]
n ,W[1:K])→ Q
[k]
n → F, and (177) follows from identical
distribution constraint in (10). The lemma is proved.
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